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SELECTED  BIBLIOGRAPHY  29 The latest and most important chapter in the progressive liberalization 
of world trade is currently being written in Geneva, Switzerland. It  is 
there that the European Economic Community (EEC), the United 
States, Japan, and some 70 other participants are holding the "Tokyo 
Round" of Multilateral Trade Negotiations ( MTN's). The outcome of 
these talks, the most comprehensive negotiations ever held to reduce 
barriers and distortions to the flow of international commerce, will be a 
critical factor in determining whether the momentum towards trade 
liberalization which has prevailed for the past 30 years can be continued. 
As in the previous tariff-cutting exercises, the European Community 
will be important and active participants. Throughout its history, the 
Community has been dedicated first to completely free trade in indus-
trial and agricultural products internally, between its member countries, 
and secondly, to a balanced expansion of world trade through pro-
gressive liberalization of trade restrictions. 
In a major policy statement in July 1973, concerning the "Tokyo 
Round," the Community expressed the conviction that international 
trade is a "vital and increasingly important factor in its development," 
the hope that "the policy of liberalizing trade will be continued," and 
the promise that it "intends to assume its responsibilities at the inter-
national level toward both industrialized and developing countries." 
That the Community's average import duty of 7 per cent on indus-
trial products is the lowest of all major trading powers is evidence of its 
commitment to trade liberalization and its participation in past tariff 
cutting exercises. 
5 The evolution of the contemporary international trading system is 
mirrored in the six rounds of multilateral trade negotiations which have 
been completed since the end of World War II. 
Each of these negotiations has been conducted under the auspices of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Begun in 1948, 
the GATT is a multilateral trade treaty embodying reciprocal commer-
cial rights and obligations. It  has become the main forum for multi-
lateral trade negotiations, with headquarters and a professional secre-
tariat in Geneva. However, it is not formally an international institu-
tion. The technical agreement which embodies the GATT consists of four 
basic provisions: 
•  Nondiscrimination. Through the GATT's "most-favored nation" 
clause ( MFN), each country's negotiated concessions apply equally to 
all signatories. Any concession made to one country must be extended 
to all. The major exceptions stipulated involve generalized tariff prefer-
ences extended by industrialized countries to developing countries and 
customs unions and free trade areas. (A customs union, like a free trade 
area, is a grouping of countries which have agreed to eliminate all or 
most obstacles to trade among themselves. The customs union carries 
the process one step further than the free trade area by establishing a 
common and uniform tariff schedule for imports from all non-member 
countries.) 
•  Tariff protection. Tariffs, not quotas, are the sanctioned means of 
protecting domestic industries from foreign competition. 
•  Consultation. Existing and potential trade disputes should be sub-
mitted to consultation. 
•  A framework. A forum is provided for holding periodic negotiations 
to reduce trade barriers and codify the results in a legal instrument. 
The first four rounds of GATT tariff-cutting negotiations took place in 
194  7,  1949, 1950-51, and 1955-56. All dealt overwhelmingly with 
tariffs, and all were dominated by the United States' policy of fostering 
economic recovery and cooperation in Western Europe. 
The fourth negotiation, the "Dillon Round" of 1960-62, followed 
the establishment of the EEC  in  1958. For the first time, the EEc's 
common agricultural policy (CAP) and customs union with its common 
external tariff ( CET)  were the subject of negotiations. The Dillon 
Round was preceded by negotiations with the Community under GATT 
Article XXIV-6 necessitated by the introduction of the common external 
tariff in order to replace concessions previously granted by the Commu-
nity's six founding members (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands). 
These concessions were gradually incorporated into the emerging 
common external tariff which were then replacing individual country 
7 tariffs on industrial goods. These negotiations fulfilled the Community's 
obligations under the GATT. In sanctioning customs unions, GATT 
Article XXIV stipulates that the common external duties subsequently 
imposed must not on the whole be larger or more restrictive than the 
general incidence of duties collectively applied by individual member 
countries before forming the union. In short, no net increase in tariffs or 
other restrictions should result from the merging of individual rates 
into a common external tariff. 
To prevent such an increase, the other GATT contracting parties are 
given the details of any proposed customs union so that they can deter-
mine the compatibility of the proposed arrangements with Article 
XXIV-6. For an arrangement to be accepted the other GATT signatories 
must not disapprove the basic rules of the proposed customs union. 
In 1962, the GATT de facto approved the objectives and tariff adjust-
ments outlined in the 1957 Rome Treaty creating the EEC. The meas-
urement of the external trade impact of the CAP was deferred, since it 
was still being drafted during the Dillon Round. 
Nevertheless, a series of bilateral negotiations between the Commu-
nity and its main partners resulted in a new EC tariff schedule. These 
concessions were supplemented by those granted multilaterally during 
the Dillon Round. 
The Dillon Round's main accomplishment, therefore, was to prove 
that the Community's internal trade liberalization could be reconciled 
with its external commitment to the further growth of international 
trade as a whole. In the words of a White House press release of March 
7, 1962, "The commercial importance of the negotiations was matched 
by their political significance, since they constituted the first test of 
whether the United States and the European Economic Community 
would be able to find a mutual basis for the long-run development of 
economic relations critical to both areas." 
The Dillon Round was the last of the "first generation" postwar trade 
negotiations. The maturation of the Community, as well as the emer-
gence of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the growing 
size and complexity of world trade, and the ambitious US Trade Expan-
sion Act of 1962 all served to create the need for a more ambitious kind 
of negotiation. 
This need was fulfilled, when in May 1964, the Kennedy Round of 
negotiations began. Substantively, it differed from its predecessors in 
four respects: 
•  The emphasis was placed on linear tariff reductions, reductions of a 
uniform percentage across-the-board, instead of the old item-by-item 
approach. 
8 -· 
•  More consideration was given than in the past to specific liberaliza-
tion of trade in agricultural commodities. 
•  Some non  tariff barriers were examined. 
•  Concern was expressed about developing countries' trade problems. 
Procedurally, the Article xxtv-6 negotiations and the Dillon Round 
were unique in that EC member countries were, for the first time, col-
lectively represented by the EC Commission instead of by their respec-
tive national delegations. 
The understanding eventually reached between the American and 
EC delegations was principally responsible for the successful outcome 
of the negotiations: tariffs on a wide range of industrial goods were 
reduced by 50 per cent and many more by at least 30 per cent. Overall, 
industrial tariffs were lowered by an average of 35 per cent. 
For the first time, agreements were reached in the agricultural sector. 
They included tariff reductions, a new grains arrangement which raised 
the minimum price of wheat that was traded internationally, and a joint 
food aid commitment designed to distribute obligations to provide such 
aid to less developed countries more evenly. 
In addition, a new antidumping code was adopted, and the United 
States agreed to modify its American Selling Price (ASP) system of 
tariff assessment in exchange for additional concessions on certain 
chemicals. The "chemicals agreement" was not implemented, however, 
because the US Congress did not pass legislation to eliminate ASP. The 
Congress also failed to bring US antidumping legislation into conform-
ity with the GATT antidumping code. 
The conclusion of the Kennedy Round in mid-1967 was followed by 
an official respite, while the effects of the new tariff cuts were observed 
and absorbed. But, silently, a major upheaval in the international eco-
nomic system was brewing. The imposition of the New Economic 
Policy by the United States on August 15, 1971, had significant inter-
national dimensions: imposition of a 10 per cent import surcharge and 
termination of the dollar's convertibility into gold. These draconian 
measures, and the Community's enlargement, signaled the urgent need 
for multilateral negotiations to consider not only an updating of inter-
national trade rules and procedures, but the reconstruction of a rup-
tured international monetary system as well. 
9 The scope of the seventh round of multilateral trade negotiations was 
outlined in the "Tokyo Declaration" of September 1973, approved by 
the trade ministers of some 100 countries. It declared that the MTN's 
objectives were "to achieve the expansion and ever greater liberaliza-
tion of world trade and improvement in the standard of living and wel-
fare of the people of the world . . . through the progressive dismantling 
of obstacles to trade and the improvement of the international frame-
work for the conduct of world trade . .. [and to] secure additional 
benefits for the international trade of developing countries ... .  " 
The preparation leading up to the declaration can be traced back to 
late 1967. It was then that the GATT Secretariat began technical research 
on three major issues-trade in industrial goods, agricultural trade, and 
the less developed countries' trade problems-in preparation for pos-
sible future negotiations. In February 1972, the political phase was 
ushered in by a "Joint Declaration" by the Community and the United 
States which confirmed their intention to initiate and support wide-
ranging trade negotiations in the GATT. 
The creation of the Trade Negotiating Committee (TNC)  was the 
most important organizational decision announced in the Tokyo 
Declaration. The TNc's function is to "elaborate and put into effect de-
tailed trade negotiating plans and to establish appropriate negotiating 
procedures [and] to supervise the progress of the negotiations." To en-
courage participation by non-GATT countries (mainly Lnc's and Com-
munist bloc countries), the TNC is not a formal instrumentality of the 
GATT. A fully independent phenomenon created to manage the MTN's, 
it is open to any interested country. Thus, the Tokyo Round is not offi-
cially a GATT negotiation. It  is, however, being conducted at the GATT's 
headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland, to take advantage of its physical 
facilities and to tap the Secretariat's expertise. 
In response to the complex and comprehensive nature of the MTN's, 
the second meeting of the TNC, in February 1974, spawned six working 
groups to handle each of the major topics on the agenda. They are: the 
Tariffs Group; the NontariffMeasures Group (which created four sub-
groups for studying quantitative restrictions, customs matters, technical 
barriers to trade, subsidies and countervailing duties); the Agriculture 
Group (with subgroups for grains, meat, and dairy products); the Safe-
guards Group; the Sectors Group, and the Tropical Products Group. 
The common appreciation of the need for further multilateral reduc-
tions in trade barriers to prevent unilateral backsliding has once again 
brought representatives of every major trading power to the negotiating 
table. On the one hand, the Tokyo Round is the logical progression of 
previous GATT negotiations. On the other hand, it is a unique negotia-
tion, reflecting the recent structural changes in the international econ-
11 omy and the success of earlier negotiations in reducing the relative 
importance of many of the customs duties in industrial trade. Non  tariff 
measures (formerly referred to as "non  tariff barriers"), not tariffs, are 
the major obstacles to international trade today. The trend away from 
tariff issues (and US insistance) also means that agricultural trade 
problems must be fully discussed and related to agreements in the in-
dustrial sector. Finally, the questions of commodity cartels and export 
controls have increased the leverage of the resource-rich but capital-
poor developing countries. North-South trade issues have therefore 
been given a prominent spot on the agenda. 
The reconciliation of the Community's common external tariff with 
GATT requirements dominated the Dillon Round. It will not be a major 
factor in the Tokyo Round. The new generation of trade issues is far 
more complex: the previously neglected non tariff measures, questions 
of agricultural support and protection programs, and the trade prob-
lems of less developed countries. 
12 The resolution of these weighty problems becomes the unenviable task 
of the trade negotiators in Geneva. Accommodation between the dele-
gations of the European Communities and the United States will be the 
critical factor determining the success or failure of the Tokyo Round. 
To assess the outlook for their dialogue, the European and American 
approaches to the major trade issues are discussed below. 
1. TARIFFS 
How far tariff rates have been whittled down in the six preceding GATT 
negotiations can be seen from a 1974 GATT study. The average rates of 
customs duties levied on industrial products by the world's major 
traders were reported as follows:  EEC, 7 per cent; United States, 7.5 per 
cent; Japan, 9.8 per cent; Canada, 7 per cent. 
Nevertheless, tariffs still will be an important topic of discussion in 
the Tokyo Round. In the first place, the averaging technique masks nu-
merous high duty rates, especially in the United States. Secondly, the 
fact that rates tend to be relatively low on raw materials and semi-
processed goods, while being relatively high on finished manufactures, 
means that the nominal, or apparent, tariff rates often understate their 
real impact. This impact falls especially hard on developing countries 
which are trying to diversify their export mix. In economic terms, the 
effective, or real, rates of duty afford more protection to domestic pro-
ducers than the listed nominal rates.* 
The most complete public exposition of the EC's position on the tariff 
question appears in the Council of Ministers "overall view" of June 
I 973. (Though superceded by internal directives and subject to altera-
tion in the course of the trade negotiations, the statement can be used as 
the basis for examining the Community's overall approach to the issues 
on the MTN's agenda.) 
A "significant lowering" of customs duties is called for, through pro-
cedures that are simple and as generally applicable as possible. Having 
made this fundamental commitment to tariff reductions, the Council 
went on to stipulate two basic criteria. The first is to opt for the "har-
monization" approach to tariff cutting. This means that the higher a 
given tariff duty, the larger should be the percentage reduction in that 
':'  By way of illustration, let us assume that a country imports lumber and nails 
duty free, but imposes a 20 per cent tariff on tables. Let us further assume that the 
raw materials account for one-half the cost of the tables. with cutting and 
assembly (value added) accounting for the remainder. Finally, assume all tables 
sell for $100. An importer would pay a nominal tariff rate of $20 (20 per cent of 
$1 00). But since raw materials enter duty free, this nominal rate is in real terms 
only being applied to the value added, the $50 cost of assembling the table. 
The etlective tariff protection is therefore 40 per cent (the $20 tariff as a percent-
age of the $50 value added). 
13 tariff. This approach would narrow the disparities in existing rates. In 
the words of the Council: 
"The rules for lowering tariffs must necessarily take into account the 
considerable differences which exist between the customs tariffs applied 
by the developing countries. Quite apart from the question of the gen-
eral level of tariffs, some countries apply tariffs of a roughly homogene-
ous level to all products while others apply very high tariffs to some 
products and much lower ones to others. 
"The rules adopted should aim ... at leveling off the differences 
caused by these peaks and troughs ... . 
"This is the only approach which would make it possible to avoid a 
situation in which, following further reductions of customs tariffs, some 
would be so low that certain countries would have little hope of subse-
quently obtaining reductions in the higher customs duties which some 
of their partners would have been able to maintain. 
"The procedures should take account of the fact that the actual level 
of protection should be calculated on the basis of the added value." 
The second basic EC criterion is the concept that there should be a 
threshold, or floor, below which no tariff reductions would be called for. 
The reasons for this position include the fear that radical tariff reduc-
tions would neutralize the beneficial effects of tariff preference arrange-
ments applied to the exports of developing countries, the fear that coun-
tries with very low rates would very soon lose all protection, leaving 
them with very little to offer trading partners in future negotiations. 
The Community has also stated that whatever formula is devised for 
negotiating tariff reductions, it would give special consideration to de-
veloping countries, for example, by considering more substantial tariff 
cuts for certain products or in other cases less substantial cuts to main-
tain some preference margins available through generalized preferences. 
Although the Community prefers an end to higher duties, together 
with approved minimum tariff levels, the Council noted that it was still 
prepared to negotiate total duty elimination on a case by case basis 
where economic circumstances warranted it. 
The American position favors the "linear" approach, the uniform 
percentage reductions across the board used in the Kennedy Round. 
The reasons for this preference are two-fold: 
•  The United States has a relatively large number of high duty rates, 
(together with a relatively large number of very low rates) which would 
be heavily affected by the harmonization approach. 
•  The US Trade Reform Act, which authorizes the American delega-
tion to reduce US tariffs, is effectively linear in nature. It authorizes 
tariff reductions of up to 60 per cent in duties currently above 5 per cent 
and total elimination where duties are 5 per cent or less. It should be 
14 noted, however, that this is only an authorization which does not pre-
clude the adoption of another approach. Work has begun in Geneva on 
some working hypothesis for a general formula. 
2. NONT  ARIFF MEASURES 
Non  tariff measures ( NTM's), formerly referred to as "non  tariff bar-
riers," en  com  pass a wide range of policies and measures which are gen-
erally distortions to trade, obstacles to imports, or governmental incen-
tives to exports. The GATT Secretariat has compiled a11 inventory of 
more than 800 NTM's submitted to it by member countries and broken 
into five groups of 2 7 specific practices. The "GATT Illustrative List of 
Non  tariff Measures" including the following: 
Group 1  Government Participation in Trade 
a.  Trade diverting aids 
b.  Export subsidies 
c.  Countervailing duties 
d.  Government procurement 
e.  State trading in market-economy countries 
f.  Other restrictive practices 
Group 2  Customs and Administrative Entry Procedures 
a.  Valuation 
b.  Antidumping duties 
c.  Customs classification 
d.  Consular and customs formalities and documentation 
(i)  consular formalities and fees 
(ii)  customs clearance documentation 
(iii)  certificates of origin 
e.  Samples requirements 
Group 3  Standards 
a.  Standards 
b.  Packaging, labeling and marketing regulations 
Group 4  Specific Limitations on Trade 
a.  Quantitative restrictions 
b.  Discriminatory bilateral agreements 
c.  Export restraints 
d.  Minimum price regulations 
e.  Licensing 
f.  Motion picture restrictions 
Group 5  Charges on Imports 
a.  Prior deposits 
b.  Credit restrictions for importers 
15 c.  Variable levies 
d.  Fiscal adjustments at the border or otherwise 
e.  Restrictions on foreign wines and spirits 
f.  Discriminatory taxes on motor cars 
g.  Statistical and administrative duties 
h.  Special duties on imports 
The extent and diversity of this list has suggested to all participants 
in the Tokyo Round that no general solution to NTM's is feasible and 
that each must be dealt with separately. The 1973 Council of Ministers' 
overall view stated that the diversity of NTM's "makes it unrealistic to 
seek a solution of a general character [and] there must therefore be a 
case by case approach." This complexity also means that reciprocity is 
harder to assess in this area than for customs duties, "so a broad spread 
of solutions will be needed to make up a worthwhile and well balanced 
package." 
Further Community ideas were spelled out by Paul Luyten, head of 
the EC delegation, to the TNC meeting in February 1975. The Commu-
nity, he said, advocated the following points 
•  the need to select the types of measures which should be negotiated, 
in particular, tnose which create the greatest obstacles to international 
trade 
•  where multilateral solutions can be envisaged, the need for these to 
be recognized and adopted by as many countries as possible 
•  the desirability in certain cases of confining the benefits of these solu-
tions to the participating countries 
•  the need for suitable mechanisms for consultation and settlement of 
disputes 
•  the probable need for a mechanism for applying sanctions. 
The Community also supported the establishment of a separate pro-
cedure for discussion and consultation to review any legislative actions 
that countries are thinking of invoking in the future which might directly 
or indirectly have an impact on trade flows. "This seems now to be at 
least as important as the solutions of this or that specific non  tariff bar-
rier problem, since it is a question of securing the future," said Luyten. 
The American strategy here has been generally similar to the EC's 
overall view. The Trade Act gives the US delegation wide discretion to 
negotiate agreements to harmonize, reduce, or eliminate NTM's. How-
ever, any US commitment to an NTB agreement becomes legally binding 
only upon approval by both houses of Congress. (To speed the legisla-
tive process, the act provides for automatic discharge of an NTB agree-
ment from committee, limits floor debate, sets a time limit for a final 
vote, and prohibits any amendments to the measure being voted on.) 
16 Both the Community and the Americans have set priorities for im-
mediate attention and negotiation. The US delegation has stressed prod-
uct standards, export subsidies, and government procurement practices. 
In each case, the mode of agreement would be a GATT code, to which all 
trading countries would adhere, and which would enumerate obliga-
tions and criteria in general terms. 
Some EC and US priorities overlap, but there are some points of con-
tention and differences in perspective. The Community has recorded its 
willingness to discuss export subsidies on industrial products. At the 
same time, it has criticized the US law which allows the imposition of 
countervailing duties without demonstration that the import has injured 
domestic industry. The Community advocates universal adherence to 
the GATT requirement that proof of injury precede sanctions against ex-
port subsidies. 
On the standards issue, the Community has also agreed to establish a 
general set of international commitments. Two preconditions to such 
an agreement are: 
•  Each country should be equally bound to the agreement. (For exam-
ple, the laws of all 50 US states should not conflict with the Federal 
Statute commiting the United States to an international standards code.) 
•  A meaningful number of countries should subscribe to the code and 
any notification procedure should not impose "inflationary new bureau-
cratic requirements." 
Customs procedures and quantitative restrictions are the other two 
NTM's which the Community would like to deal with in the first phase 
of the Tokyo Round. 
3. AGRICULTURE 
Agriculture is at once one of the most complex areas facing the nego-
tiators and one of the most critical for the outcome of the MTN's. Agri-
cultural policies have deep roots in the domestic political and social 
policies of most countries. Virtually all governments extensively inter-
vene in such issues as protection levels, acreage allotments, prices, and 
farm income. The resulting tariff and non  tariff measures, designed to 
protect domestic farming, transcend trade questions and embrace po-
litical and social objectives. As a result, previous multilateral trade 
negotiations have given more attention to industrial trade barriers than 
to their agricultural counterparts. 
The agricultural question thus far in the Tokyo Round has been ar-
ticulated mainly by the US and the EC delegations. Two basic policy 
differences have emerged. The first is procedural and stems from the 
fact that no agricultural commodity can be negotiated without dealing 
with every device used to protect domestic production. It  devolves from 
17 the European preference for treating agriculture as a separate and dis-
tinct subject whose unique characteristics cannot be compared with in-
dustrial trade. The US delegation has emphasized a functional approach 
which would allow discussions of agricultural tariffs, NTM's, safeguards, 
and other agricultural issues to be handled in the appropriate MTN 
working group. The Community, conversely, has asked that the agri-
cultural working group be the all-inclusive forum for negotiations in this 
sector. 
The second policy difference is substantive, concerning  th'~ track that 
negotiations should take in coming to grips with barriers and distortions 
in farm trade. The Community has emphasized that international com-
modity agreements should be used to stabilize world prices and long-
term supply for the main commodities. The Americans have sought re-
ductions in direct trade barriers and in the Community's agricultural 
levies (which in turn would reduce the protection at the frontiers). The 
two positions reflect broad differences in the US and European philoso-
phies and farm policies as well as domestic constituency pressures. 
The EC Council has stated that "those elements basic to its unity and 
fundamental objectives" could not be "called into question" during the 
MTN's. The common agricultural policy (CAP)  which iegulates EC in-
ternal and external agricultural policy is one of those elements, a fact 
which influences the EC position on agricultural trade. The 1973 Coun-
cil of Ministers' overall approach put the matter in these terms: "The 
common agricultural policy corresponds to special conditions of agri-
culture within the Community. Its principles and mechanisms should 
not be called into question and therefore do not constitute a matter for 
negotiation." 
The Council saw the objectives of the MTN's as being the expansion 
of trade within more stable world markets in accordance with existing 
polices. The best way of achieving that objective was said to be the or-
ganization of orderly world marketing arrangements by means of appro-
priate international agreements. 
The specifics of this approach were explained by the EC delegation 
at the February 1975 TNC meeting. It includes 
•  systematic and regular exchange of information and periodical anal-
ysis of the situation to guide government farm policy planning 
•  international agreements, tailored to each commodity's characteris-
tics, for products essential to human food consumption (cereals, rice, 
sugar, and dairy products). The agreements should include stockpiling 
and price provisions. 
•  "concerted discipline" between exporters and importers of other im-
portant products not covered by international agreements 
•  reciprocal tariff reductions on products that are protected by tariffs. 
18 The US negotiating position is based on the desire to exploit that 
country's natural competitive advantage in a wide range of agricultural 
products by maximizing access to foreign markets. In addition, the 
Trade Act implies that the agricultural sector should be given emphasis 
and treatment equivalent to trade liberalization efforts in the industrial 
sector. With regard to the CAP, the United States has placed high prior-
ity on securing lower levies from the Community for certain commod-
ities and on limiting the CAP's use of "export subsidies." Conceivably, 
such demands could be met by modifications in the CAP, rather than 
structural changes. Like the Community, the United States supports 
development of a system to provide importing countries with a more 
secure access to supply of agricultural products. 
In the meantime, attempts to reconcile the various national interests 
in agriculture continue in the three agricultural subgroups: dairy, cere-
als, and meat. In each group, the EC delegation has offered precise sug-
gestions, based on world agreements, which it considers the sign of its 
willingness to negotiate agriculture within the GATT framework. 
4. SAFEGUARDS 
The question of providing an improved multilateral safeguard system 
to ease the adjustment impact of import competition is an especially 
sensitive one. The Tokyo Round not only is seeking comprehensive im-
port liberalization but is also being conducted in the midst of an interna-
tional recession where virtually all trading nations are suffering high 
rates of unemployment. 
The starting off point for the discussion of improved safeguards is the 
GATT'S Article XIX. This article stipulates that a country may suspend 
existing commitments or impose new barriers if imports of a product 
expand so much as to injure, or threaten to injure, a domestic producer 
seriously. The article specifies that safeguards are strictly temporary 
and are to be administered on a non-discriminatory basis. Finally, ex-
porting countries affected by the new barriers are authorized to retaliate 
unless the country imposing the "escape clause" action extends com-
pensation in the form of tariff concessions on other products of interest 
to the exporting countries. 
There is general agreement that Article XIX has not been satisfactor-
ily applied. For example, some countries have circumvented it by de-
manding that exporting countries adopt "voluntary" export restraints. 
Additionally, the non-discriminatory clause prevents application 
against what might be only one or two exporting countries responsible 
for the injury in a specific situation. (Hence, "innocent" exporters face 
the same injury-imposed barriers as the major exporter. Article XIX, in 
fact, has not often been invoked.) 
19 There is no general consensus, however, on what improvements, if 
any, should be made. The Tokyo Declaration merely suggests that the 
adequacy of Article XIX be examined. Current talks on the safeguard 
issue remain purely technical. Technical questions include the criteria 
and procedures under which an importing nation could utilize the safe-
guard system, its obligations and responsibilities while invoking such 
measures, the nature of international surveillance and controls over 
countries using the system, and the selective application of restrictive 
measures to only the exporting countries responsible for the importing 
country's problem. 
The European Community wants to build on Article XIX, rather than 
develop an entirely new safeguard provision. The 1973 Council of Min-
isters' overall view stated that the provisions of Article XIX should be 
maintained, but that the Community would participate in "any deliber-
ations aimed at trying to establish a better practical application of the 
safeguard clause" since the article has "proved difficult to operate effec-
tively." 
The American delegation has expressed interest in exploring the 
safeguard question on a broad front. To some extent, it will want any 
new safeguard system to be compatible with the Trade Act's new escape 
clause and adjustment assistance provisions which ease American 
industries' and workers' access to relief from import competition. 
S. TROPICAL PRODUCTS 
More than any of the previous negotiations, the Tokyo Round will deal 
with "North-South" trade problems, mainly looking to improve the ac-
cess of less developed countries' exports to the markets of industrialized 
economies. The Tokyo Declaration states that a principal aim of the 
MTN's is to "secure additional benefits for the international trade of de-
veloping countries." It  goes on to state that the developed countries do 
not expect reciprocity from the developing countries inconsistent with 
their trade and development needs. Special measures are needed, ac-
cording to the Tokyo Declaration, to help developing countries increase 
their export earnings and further their economic development. It  was 
recognized that it was necessary to improve existing systems of general-
ized tariff preferences for developing countries' manufactured and semi-
manufactured exports. 
The Tokyo Declaration also called for negotiations on barriers to im-
ports of tropical products, which it labeled a "special and priority sec-
tor." The Community fully agrees that the developing countries' trade 
opportunities should be expanded, that tariff and nontariff barriers to 
the flow of tropical products should continue to be liberalized, and that 
20 other issues, such as price stability, should be taken up in the negotia-
tions. 
As a result of this consensus, the Tropical Products Group made 
more progress than any other working group in the early months of the 
negotiations. After extensive data collection on tropical products, nego-
tiations proper were begun with submissions of request lists from the 
developing countries. The industrial countries then studied these lists 
for the requested unilateral concessions' possible impact on trade. 
Promising a prompt Community response to the developing coun-
tries' requests on tropical products, EC official Theodorus Hijzen told 
the TNC in July 1975 that the Community hopes to provide a substantial 
and diversified offer. The Community has linked concessions on tropical 
products to negotiations on other products and has suggested that some 
"contribution" be requested from the developing countries in return 
"on a basis which is compatible and consistent with their trade and de-
velopment needs and their economic means." 
6. THE SECTOR APPROACH 
The negotiators also have been examining the technical possibilities for 
studying tariff and non tariff trade questions to see how they affect the 
particular problems of individual product sectors. The GATT Secretariat 
has already completed a study of trade measures associated with the 
ores and metals section (including iron, steel, and aluminum). Addi-
tional studies have been suggested by the United States, which pro-
moted the use of the sectoral approach, but the US Trade Reform Act 
specifies that the American negotiators are to obtain export opportu-
nities equivalent to opportunities in the US market for the "appropriate 
product sectors." Furthermore, the act states that "negotiations shall, 
to the extent feasible, be conducted on the basis of appropriate sectors 
of manufacturing." 
The Community is willing to consider using this sectoral approach 
in the later negotiations and believes that a thorough analysis is needed 
to see whether or not the sectoral approach benefits all MTN partici-
pants. In his July address to the TNC, Hijzen stated that the sectoral 
approach cannot substitute for general, across-the-board solutions in 
both tariff and NTM fields. 
7. ACCESS TO SUPPLY 
Although not specifically mentioned in the Tokyo Round's agenda in 
the fall of 1975, but still of importance in the current thinking of trade 
policy-makers, are the related issues of access to supply and export re-
21 straints. This concern stems from events which occurred after the Tokyo 
Declaration. The success of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Producers (OPEC) cartel in raising oil prices had a dramatic impact in 
its own right. But it also opened the possibility that it might serve as the 
protoype for new commodity cartels. On the export controls issue, the 
Arab oil embargo occurred, and there is continuing pressure on US 
policy-makers to put export controls on agricultural commodities (soy-
beansin 1974, wheat in 1975). 
As a result, the previously exclusive concern with import barriers as 
the major impediments to trade has ended. Almost every industrial 
country is now investigating arrangements to guarantee access to stable 
supplies of raw materials at reasonable prices. In the EC view, while 
export barriers are not a major issue during an international economic 
slowdown, a resumption of economic growth could reactivate the sup-
ply issue. The Community also holds that export restrictions represent 
just as much a trade barrier as import restrictions in the long run. Thus, 
they should be an integral part of the negotiations, possibly being treated 
within the NTM Group's study of quantitative restrictions and within 
negotiations on a particular product area. 
The United States shares a similar viewpoint. Ambassador Frederick 
B. Dent, the US Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, told the 
July 1975 TNC meeting that although his country has no defined or spe-
cific negotiating objectives in this area, the supply access issue belongs 
on the negotiating agenda. The United States indicated that it is pre-
pared to extend and to request specific commitments on supply access 
as part of the reciprocal exchange of concessions which will take place 
throughout the MTN's in existing work groups. 
The United States has also said that the specific issue of export re-
strictions is within the competence of the MTN subgroup on quantitative 
restrictions. In addition, the United States believes that at an appropri-
ate time and within an appropriate group, existing GATT rules on export 
restrictions should be reviewed to see whether they should be supple-
mented. At a minimum, it feels the trading system should provide a set 
of procedures and guidelines to speed the resolution of disputes over 
supply access issues and to solve supply access problems in a way that 
reinforces rather than undermines the multilateral character of the trad-
ing system. 
Although it will be difficult to reach a comprehensive international 
agreement on a strict code of conduct, it should be feasible, as in the 
cases of a standards code and of some NTM's, to develop general guide-
lines balancing the interests of importing and exporting countries and 
establishing broad obligations and responsibilities on those countries 
imposing export restrictions. 
22 8. THE TIMING OF AGREEMENTS 
A continuing procedural disagreement between the Community and the 
United States has revolved around the question of whether the MTN's 
should end with a single, comprehensive agreement or whether individ-
ual agreements on specific trade issues should be concluded. 
The Community believes that each major topic on the MTN agenda 
is interrelated and that concessions in one area may be offset by conces-
sions in other areas. It  would be difficult to obtain the overall balance 
and reciprocity foreseen by the Tokyo Declaration within any single 
trade negotiating sector. The Community, therefore, has opted for "bal-
anced and global progress" which suggests a broad package offering 
mutual advantages to many countries. 
The US delegation, burdened by the knowledge that it will need Con-
gressional approval on a number of trade agreements, has urged a more 
fragmented approach, hoping to reach early agreement on the less divi-
sive issues. The previous US advocacy of an "early harvest" approach 
has been moderated to suggest that the MTN's six working groups iden-
ti~y "interim concrete results by which we can measure progress toward 
the agreed objectives in the Tokyo Declaration." ln addition to putting 
certain agreed measures into effect before the MTN's conclusion, the 
United States would be agreeable to "interim concrete results" taking 
such lesser forms as a set of detailed objectives, a draft text, or a partial 
or temporary agreement. 
9. THE LINK TO INTERNATIONAL MONETARY TALKS 
The EC delegation alone has suggested that agreements reached in the 
MTN's are related to progress made in the ongoing international mone-
tary negotiations seeking, among other objectives, to secure basic rules 
of the road on floating exchange rates. The Community believes that if 
sharp movements in exchange rates continue, this could distort or neu-
tralize trade concessions. An appreciating rate could double, or triple, 
the real effects of a concession. A depreciating rate could neutralize the 
real effects of a trade concession. It  is the European contention, there-
fore, that the prospect for negotiating increased stability in exchange 
rates should be a consideration in the commitments made at the Tokyo 
Round. 
23 For those who wish to extrapolate on the basis of divergent negotiating 
postures and the relatively slow progress made during the early months 
of the Tokyo Round, it is easy to paint a pessimistic picture of the 
chances for a successful agreement on further trade liberalization. On 
the other hand, there is no reason to expect a quick and smooth agree-
ment on so complex, politically sensitive, and wide range of trade issues. 
Neither is there any reason to brand any party's negotiating posture 
dogmatic or inflexible. 
All sides have differing interests and divergent viewpoints. Still, the 
EC negotiators, like their counterparts, are present in Geneva to nego-
tiate, not to defend a fixed position. The Community, for example, has 
agreed to look at a wide variety of technical questions on a case by case 
basis, even where there is general philosophical or policy disagreement. 
The hard fact that a major series of multilateral negotiations could 
begin and prosper in the midst of a major international economic slow-
down is itself testimony to the major trading powers' foresight and 
broad identity of common interests and objectives. The current inter-
national problem of high unemployemnt and inflation fed by sharply 
increased oil prices normally would have produced a textbook case of 
revision to new import barriers and a hearty distaste for further trade 
liberalization. Fortunately, the unpleasant and unproductive results of 
previous attempts to "beggar-thy-neighbor" arc still fresh in the minds' 
of today's economic officials. 
The Tokyo Round also benefits from being the latest in an historical 
progression of trade negotiations all of which responded to the needs 
and pressures of a changing international trade system in general and 
of the European Community and the United States in particular. The 
Community's growth, maturation, and enlargement has historically 
been reconciled with its external obligations under the GATT. Such ac-
commodation was accomplished first in the Dillon Round, then in the 
Kennedy Round, and finally in the May 1974 successful conclusion of 
the GATT Article XXIV-6 negotiations. The Article XXIv-6 bilateral nego-
tiations were held to compensate the United States (and other trading 
partners) for the alleged adverse impact on exports that resulted after 
the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark joined the Community and 
began to apply the CAP and the common external tariff. 
Yet the eventual success of the Tokyo Round should not be taken for 
granted. There are many problems of technical interpretation still to be 
resolved. The substantive negotiations which will follow technical con-
sensus and which are the prerequisites for agreement arc still in a nas-
cent stage. 
Finally, there is the complication that the US and EC delegations will 
be negotiating on a "two branches of government" basis. In addition to 
reconciling negotiating positions at the Geneva bargaining table, each 
25 side must first reconcile its position "at home." First the private constit-
uencies, which will be directly affected by proposed trade agreements, 
must be consulted. Secondly, both negotiating teams are limited by the 
dicta of another branch of government. In the case of the United States, 
approval must be forthcoming from the Congress to bind the United 
States to trade agreements, except in the limited instance where the 
Trade Reform Act allocates authority to the Executive Branch tore-
duce tariffs. 
The Community's decision-making process involves interplay be-
tween the Council of Ministers and the Commission. The Commission 
is spokesman and negotiator for the nine EC member countries in Gen-
eva. Although it alone initiates proposals to the Council, the latter is the 
body in which the member countries' national positions are resolved 
and the solutions approved. The Commission's posture will be heavily 
influenced by the Council's guidelines in much the same way as the 
American delegation will be influenced by its reading of Congressional 
intent and mood. In accordance with the Treaty of Rome creating the 
European Economic Community, the Commission will be meeting reg-
ularly with the "113 Committee." The committee, named for Article 
113 of the treaty, is an intermediate level liaison group of national rep-
resentatives which deals with external trade issues with the Commission. 
There are many months of hard negotiations ahead. While no insur-
mountable technical problems appear to be immediately at hand, the 
continued presence of the political will for accommodation and agree-
ment will be the critical variable. 
26 Ad valorem duty. A customs duty levied as a percentage of a product's 
assessed value. 
ASP. American Selling Price. A US customs valuation procedure 
whereby the US wholesale price, instead of the foreign selling price, is 
used as the basis for assessing customs duties. Applies to benzenoid 
chemicals, rubber-soled footwear with fabric uppers, canned clams, 
and certain wool knit gloves. 
CAP. Common agricultural policy. The Community's farm policy 
which is designed to rationalize agricultural production and establish a 
Community-wide system of supports and import controls. The CAP cov-
ers more than 95 per cent of the Community's agricultural production. 
CET. Common external tariff. The Community's common customs 
tariff' which replaces those of its nine members. 
Commission. The policy proposing arm of the Community's dual 
executive. 
Council of Ministers. Enacts Jaws and sets policies based on proposals 
by the Commission. 
Countervailing duty. An import charge designed to offset an export sub-
sidy by another country. 
Customs union. A group of countries that eliminate tariffs on trade be-
tween members and adopts a common tariff on imports from the rest 
of the world. 
Disparity. A significant difference in tariff rates between countries on 
identical products. 
Dumping. The practice of selling goods in a foreign market at prices be-
low those at which the product sells in the home market. 
EEC. European Economic Community. See EC. 
EC. European Community or European Communities. The collective 
name for three "communities" created by three different treaties: the 
European Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Com-
munity, and the European Atomic Energy Community. Founding mem-
bers were Belgium, Fran.ce, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, and Lux-
embourg. The United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark joined on Janu-
aryl,l973. 
EFTA. European Free Trade Association. Founding members were 
the United Kingdom, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, 
Portugal, and Iceland. Denmark and the United Kingdom withdrew 
after deciding to join the Community. Finland is an associate member. 
Free trade area. A group of countries that eliminate tariffs on trade be-
tween members but which does not adopt a common tariff on imports 
from the rest of the world. 
27 GATT. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. An international ac-
cord signed in 1948, to foster growth of world trade. Provides a forum 
for multilateral tariff negotiations and, through semiannual meetings, a 
means for settling trade disputes and for discussing international trade 
problems. Has more than 80 members. 
Generalized tariff preferences. Preferential tariff treatment for manu-
factured and semimanufactured goods from developing countries. The 
Community's system, begun in 1971, covers some processed agricul-
tural products as well. 
LDC. Less developed country. 
MFN. Most-favored-nation. The policy of nondiscrimination in inter-
national trade which provides to all nations the same customs and tariff 
treatment as given the so-called "most-favored-nation." 
MTN. Multilateral Tariff Negotiations. The Tokyo Round, which 
opened in Tokyo in September 1973, is being conducted at GATT head-
quarters in Geneva, Switzerland. 
NTM. Nontariff measure, formerly known as NTB's or nontariff bar-
riers. A practice other than the use of customs tariffs which resticts or 
distorts trade. 
Sa~eguards  clause. Outlines the conditions under which trade restric-
tions that had been relaxed in negotiations may be reinstated. 
Sector approach. Formation of separate negotiating groups of countries 
interested in a specific sector. 
Tariff preference. Tariff treatment that favors certain products from a 
country or group of countries. 
TNC. Trade Negotiating Committee. The main forum for the Tokyo 
Round of Multilateral Tariff Negotiations. It allows non-members of 
the GATT to participate in the negotiations. 
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